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I. INTRODUCTION

At the end of last year, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its
decision in Beals v. Saldanha.' This case had appeared some years before in the
courts of Ontario where a Florida plaintiff had sought the recognition and
enforcement of a Florida federal district court decision awarding damages
against Ontario resident defendants concerning a small land purchase that had
gone bad. It was unexceptional, save perhaps for the impressive quantum of
damages enterprising Florida plaintiffs managed to secure in default proceedings before the Florida court. Nevertheless, it became the chosen vehicle of
Canada's highest court to complete the evolution of a judge-made transformation of Canadian conflict of laws principles specific to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments that it had embarked upon thirteen years
earlier with its seminal ruling in MorguardInvestments Ltd. v. DeSavoye.2 For
an American legal audience, the decision is significant. It confirms the correctness of lower court rulings which had applied the Morguardprecedent- itself
a case confined to inter-provincial recognition and enforcement within the
Canadian federation-to foreign judgments. Most of these cases, not
*
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1.

Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, 465.

2.

Morguard Investments, Ltd. v. DeSavoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.
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unantisurprisingly, emanated from various U.S. jurisdictions, with initially
3
defendants.
Canadian
for
consequences
cipated and sometimes harsh
From a Canadian legal standpoint, particularly from an incoming perspective on international litigation, Beals and the previous pattern of Canadian court
decisions that it has vindicated, suggests a level playing field that may have
been irretrievably lost, absent legislative redress domestically or, if possible, by
treaty at the international level.4 That too, should be of interest from an
American law reform perspective that has perennially viewed the U.S. legal
system as considerably more hospitable to the enforcement efforts of foreign
plaintiffs than American plaintiffs tend to receive from other legal systems.5
But my basic message today is that Americans have nothing to complain about
north of the border. For hunters of compensation in Canada for damages done
to them outside of Canada, we might even go so far as to say that the Supreme
Court has declared an "open season" on Canadian assets.
II. A REVISED STATUS QUO

Not long ago, Canadian courts rigorously adhered to the English-somewhat imperial-common law approach to recognition and enforcement issues
which allowed that, unless the Canadian defendant had voluntarily attorned to
the jurisdiction of the foreign court, or was otherwise deemed to be found within
that jurisdiction in certain circumstances,6 the foreign proceeding could be
safely ignored. The foreign plaintiff would be required to sue on its judgment,
against which a full defence on the merits could then be waged at home. This

3.
The new standard for recognition and enforcement raised serious issues for Canadian defendants
including the following: retrospective operation of Morguard, substantially different standards of foreign
justice and unpredictability of outcomes. H. Scott Fairley, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments by Canadian
Courts: A New Age of Uncertainty, 2 CAN. INT'L LAW. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments-Can.Cts.].
4.
H. Scott Fairley, In Search of a Level PlayingField: The Hague Project on Jurisdictionand

the Recognition andEnforcement of ForeignJudgments, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ISSUES: CONFLICT AND COHERENCE 57 (Chi Carmody et. al. eds., 2003).
Ronald A. Brand, Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts, 2 CAN. INT'L LAW. 10 (1996); see
5.
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 481-82 (1987).
6.
Emanuel v. Symon, 1. K. B. 302, 309 (Eng. C.A. 1908) (per curiam):
In actions inpersonamthere are five cases in which the Courts of this country will enforce a foreign judgment:
(1) Where the defendant is a subject of the foreign country in which the judgment has
been obtained; (2) where he was resident in the foreign country when the action began;
(3) where the defendant in the character of plaintiff has selected the forum in which he
is afterwards sued; (4) where he has voluntarily appeared; and (5) where he has
contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the judgment was obtained.
Vaughan Black, Enforcement of Judgment and JudicialJurisdictionin Canada,9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
546 (1989) (commenting critically on the pre-Morguardapproach of Canadian courts).
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rule applied co-equally to the enforcement of rulings from one province to
another within the Canadian federation.
Morguard abandoned the traditional English formula in relation to the
inter-provincial context, importing the American constitutional concept of "full
faith and credit"7 as between coordinate jurisdictions within national boundaries,
and posited a new formula. The enforcing court would recognize and enforce
the judgment of the originating court, precluding any further defense on the
merits, provided that first, the adjudicating court had properly exercised jurisdiction under its own rules and second that the enforcing court could satisfy
itself that there was "a real and substantial connection" between the adjudicating
jurisdiction and determinative features of the lis or the Defendant as a party.8
However, the Morguard Court, in prophetic unanimous reasons in obiter
authored by Justice LaForest, suggested that the same approach might apply to
foreign judgments of comparably civilized jurisdictions, premised on the notion
of international comity. Citing Spencer v. The Queen, the Morguard court
quoted, "[T]he recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws..." 9
The rationale for resurrecting this nineteenth century notion straight from
the pen of Justice Gray in Hilton v. Guyot'° was, however, grounded in the late
twentieth century realities of a trade dependent country. Justice LaForest
elaborated:
Accommodating the flow of wealth, skills and people across state
lines has now become imperative. Under the circumstances, our
approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
would appear ripe for reappraisal. Certainly, other countries, notably
the United States and members of the European Community, have
adopted more generous rules for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments to the general advantage of litigants."1

7.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
8.
Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1103-1109. See Enforcement of ForeignJudgments-Can.Cts.,
supra, note 3, at 2; Joost Blom, Reform of Private InternationalLaw by Judges: Canadaas a Case Study,
in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH

31-47 (James Fawcett ed., 2002).
9.

Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1096.

10.

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163--64 (1895).

11.

Morguard,[1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1098.
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This invitation to a dramatically liberalized approach was taken up enthusiastically by lower courts across Canada. 2 These endorsements entailed harsh
consequences for Canadian defendants. Many were caught by the retrospective
application of the new rule to pre-Morguard decisions made not to defend
foreign lawsuits;1 3 others by exposure to damages awards-notably from U.S.
civil juries-far in excess of anything a Canadian court would have awarded4
had the defendant been sued in a Canadian jurisdiction at first instance.1
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court chose not to revisit such concerns until it
granted leave to appeal in Beals.
III.

CONFIRMING THE STATUS

Quo:

FACT AND LAW FROM BEALS

A. CompellingFacts
An ultimately very unlucky Canadian couple, the Saldanhas, together with
another Canadian couple, the Thivys, had purchased in 1981 a vacant lot in
Florida for $4000. Three years later, they were approached by a real estate
agent to sell the lot to two American couples, which they agreed to do for the
sum of $8000. There was a mistake in the property description in the original
offer, which Mrs. Thivy corrected, and the transaction was completed. However, some months later, the American purchasers, the Beals and the Foodys,
discovered they were building a model home for a development project they had
in mind on the wrong lot, adjacent to the one they had actually purchased.
Predictably, in the spring of 1985, a variety of individuals were sued in
Florida State Court, including the Saldanhas, who filed a defense on their own
behalf; the suit was withdrawn, having been commenced in the wrong county.
A second suit was commenced in the fall of 1986, this time in the Circuit Court
of Sarasota County. The Canadian defendants were served in Ontario and Mrs.
Thivy filed an unsigned duplicate of the Saldanhas' previous defense on their
behalf. Thereafter, amended claims were served and filed in the Florida court,
but no further defenses were forthcoming from the Canadians who, alas, had not
retained Florida counsel. In the end, only the Canadians were left at the end of
a default judgment on liability in the summer of 1990. A further jury award on
damages followed in late 1991 for $210,000 in compensatory damages, an

12.

Enforcement of ForeignJudgments-Can. Cts., supra note 3; Blom, supra note 8.

13.

Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd., (1993) 106 D.L.R. (4th) 654 (BCCA), leave to appeal

refused, (1994) 24 C.P.C. (3d) 294n (Can. Sup. Ct.) (post-Morguardenforcement of pre-MorguardAlaska
Judgment). See Blom, supranote 8, at 38-39.
14.

See generally Joost Blom, The Enforcement of ForeignJudgments: MorguardGoes Forth into

the World, 28 CAN. Bus. L.J. 373 (1997); Enforcement of Foreign Judgments-Can.Cts, supranote 3, at 3-5.
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additional $50,000 in punitive damages, and post judgment interest of twelve
percent per annum, notice of which the Saldanha received for Christmas 1991.15
At this point, the Saldanhas did consult a lawyer in Ontario. Unfortunately,
that lawyer was not aware of the Morguardprecedent of the previous year or its
possible application to foreign as well as interprovincial enforcement actions.
He advised the Saldanhas to do nothing in Florida, as they had not secured legal
representation in Florida, and, as and if necessary, they could offer a full
defense in Ontario. 6 This was bad advice.
B. The Lower Court Rulings
Enforcement proceedings began in Ontario in 1993. At first instance, the
Ontario trial court refused to enforce the Florida judgment, notwithstanding
Morguard; however, not without some difficulty. 7 Justice Jennings expressed
considerable discomfort with the practical consequences of Florida justice for
the Saldanhas, and equal discomfort with the limits of the law he felt obligated
to apply. In the result, Justice Jennings reached to find an element of fraud
based on the absence of certain facts before the Florida jury, and also refused
to enforce on grounds of public policy. Although none of the traditionally
narrow grounds precluding application of penal, revenue or other foreign public
law fit the situation, Justice Jennings posited an extension of doctrine to encompass a "judicial sniff test" allowing for non-enforcement in what he viewed as
the particularly egregious circumstances that confronted him in this case.18
The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed in favor of enforcement based on
Morguardprinciples. '9Justice Doherty, joined by Justice Catzman on a threejudge panel, rejected the defense of fraud, restricting it to extrinsic circumstances, not those which the Saldanhas could have discovered with reasonable
diligence and countered had they defended themselves in Florida. The Court
viewed Justice Jennings' imaginative extension of public policy in like terms.
No matter how egregious the totality of the circumstances, Justice Doherty
concluded: "The fact of the matter is the respondents chose not to go to court
in Florida and demonstrate just how 'strange and wonderful' the allegations in
the complaint were,"" and that decision was fatal to any defense on the merits
in Ontario.

15.

Beals, [200313 S.C.R. at 427-3 1.

16.

Id. at 431.

17.

Beals v. Saldanha, 42 O.R.3d 127 (Gen'l Div., 1998).

18.

Id. at 144.

19.

Beals v. Saldanha, 54 O.R.3d 641 (C.A. 2001).

20.

Id. at 662.
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In lone dissent, Justice Weiler appealed to substantive elements of natural
justice in the context of undisclosed jeopardy arising from features of the
Florida legal system not readily apparent to foreign defendants. For her, the
procedural requirement of notice was based on "the underlying fundamental
principle of justice that defendants have a right to know the case against them
and to make an informed decision as to whether or not to present a defence,'
an opportunity never squarely presented to the Saldanhas. To this perception
was added, in the context of a potential fraud on the Florida court, the apparently less than frank disclosure of material facts by counsel for the Beals to the
Florida judge and jury.22
Of course, all of the foregoing procedural pitfalls and consequential
substantive liabilities would have become apparent had the Saldanhas engaged
competent Florida counsel. What separated the majority and dissenting voices
on the Ontario Court of Appeal, mirrored again in the Supreme Court, was their
profoundly different views on the necessity of taking that critical step.
IV. THE LAST WORD AND A FEW DISSENTING VOICES
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada (6-3) affirmed the Ontario
Court of Appeal in favor of enforcement.23 Justice Major opined:
International comity and the prevalence of international cross-border transactions and movement call for a modernization of private international law. The
principles set out in Morguard ...can and should be extended beyond the
recognition of interprovincial judgments, even though their application may
give rise to different considerations internationally. Subject to the legislatures
adopting a different approach by statute, the 'real and substantial connection'
test should apply to the law with respect to the enforcement and recognition of
foreign judgments.24
The question remains, of course, whether the common law result merits a
statutory response. Hard cases often make bad law and perhaps they should not
invite statutory revision of otherwise positive and necessary organic legal
developments. Justice Major appears not unreasonable in noting:
Here, the appellants entered into a property transaction in Florida
when they bought and sold land. Having taken this positive step to
bring themselves with the jurisdiction of Florida law, the appellants
could reasonably have been expected ... to defend the claim pursuant
to the Florida rules. Nonetheless, they were still entitled, within ten
21.

Id. at 675-76 (Weiler J., dissenting).

22.

Id. at 670.

23.

Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 431.

24.

Id.at 436.
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days, to appeal the Florida default judgment, which they did not. In
addition, the appellants did not avail themselves of the additional oneyear period to have the Florida judgment for damages set aside.
While their failure to move to set aside or appeal the Florida judgment was due to their reliance upon negligent legal advice, that negligence cannot be a bar to the enforcement of the respondents' judg25
ment.
Leaving aside the retrospective application of Morguard to the
circumstances confronted by at least the Saldanhas,2 6 Justice Major does have
a point. The substantial connections test, once accepted, appears unassailable
because if a foreign court did not properly take jurisdiction, its judgment will
not be enforced. Here, it was correctly conceded by the litigants that the Florida
court had a real and substantial connection to the action and parties.27 On this
general proposition, the Court was essentially unanimous. 28 The more troublesome question, however, is whether, in the wake of adopting the new test,
existing defenses to enforcement elaborated under the previous Anglo-Canadian
common law approach of formal attornment, also require revision. Justice
Jennings thought as much at first instance in resorting to his "judicial sniff test"
and Justice Major was not unmindful of such considerations, in which respect
it is appropriate to quote the Justice at length:
The defenses of fraud, public policy and lack of natural justice were
developed before Morguard,supra,and still pertain. This Court has
to consider whether those defenses, when applied internationally are
able to strike the balance required by comity, the balance between
order and fairness as well as the real and substantial connection, in
respect of enforcing default judgments obtained in foreign courts.
These defenses were developed by the common law courts to guard against
potential unfairness unforeseen in the drafting of the test for the recognition and
enforcement of judgments. The existing defenses are narrow in application.
They are the most recognizable situations in which an injustice may arise but are
not exhaustive.
Unusual situations may arise that might require the creation of a new
defence to the enforcement of a foreign judgment. However, the facts of this
25.

Id. at 440.

26.
The Court found that the co-defendant Dominic Thivy had secured representation in Florida and
had specifically submitted to the jurisdiction of the Florida Court. Id. at 438.
27.

Id. at 441.

28.
Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 456 (Binnie, J., lacobucci, J., concurring); Id. at 473 (LeBel, J.,
concurring).
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case do not justify speculating on that possibility. Should the evolution of
private international law require the creation of a new defence, the courts will
need to ensure that any new defences continue to be narrow in scope, address
specific facts and raise issues not covered by the existing defences. (emphasis
added)29
Justice Major goes on to apply the traditional defenses without enlargement, essentially concurring with the Ontario Court of Appeal.3 It is with these
applications, however, that the two dissenting opinions on the Supreme Court
take issue with the majority.
Justice Binnie, joined by Justice lacobucci, readily agrees that the substantial connections test "provides an appropriate conceptual basis for the
enforcement in Canada of finaljudgments obtained in foreign jurisdictions....
At the same time, however, the Binnie/lacobucci dissent emphasizes the original
domestic context and "constitutional flavour" of Morguard stressing: "We
should not backtrack on the importance of that distinction., 32
The difference between a known system of justice within national borders
and the undisclosed mysteries of foreign legal systems provide the touchstone
for Justice Binnie's dissent from the majority, but in the end, he does so within
the traditional defence of a failure of natural33justice as a ground for nonenforcement, purportedly without enlargement.
My colleague Major J. holds, in effect, that the appellants are largely the
victims of what he considers to be some ostrich-like inactivity and some poor
legal advice from their Ontario solicitor. There is some truth to this, but such
a bizarre outcome nevertheless invites close scrutiny of how the Florida
proceedings transformed a minor real estate transaction into a major financial
bonanza for the respondents.
While the notification procedures under the Florida rules may be
considered in Florida to be quite adequate for Florida residents with easy access
to advice and counsel from Florida lawyers (and there is no doubt that Florida
Procedures in general conform to a reasonable standard of fairness), nevertheless the question here is whether the appellants in this proceeding were sufficiently informed of the case against them, both with respect to liability and the
potential financial consequences, to allow them to determine in a reasonable
way whether or not to participate in the Florida action, or to let it go by
34
default.
29.

Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 441-42.

30.

Id. at 440-453.

31.

Id. at 456 (Binnie J., concurring).

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34.

Id. at 458-59 (emphasis in original).
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I do not propose to detail all the steps in Justice Binnie's argument. It
emphasizes the idiosyncrasies of Florida procedural rules-at least from a
Canadian perspective-requiring defendants to refile in response to each and
every amended claim, rendering their previous defense non-existent.35 additionally there was other information the appellants did not know. In particular, the
gradual removal of other domestic defendants, notably the Florida real estate
agent and title insurer with whom the respondents settled for comparatively
modest sums while retaining title to the property conveyed,36 all of which
remained invisible to the Saldanhas. On these cumulative findings, Justice
Binnie concludes:
I do not accept the suggestion that the appellants are the authors of their
own misfortune on the basis that if they had hired a Florida lawyer they would
have found out about all of these developments. The Appellants decided not to
defend the case set out against them in the Complaint. That case was subsequently transformed. They never had the opportunity to put their minds to the
transformed case because they were never told about it.
I do not suggest that any one of the foregoing omissions of notice would
necessarily have been fatal to enforcement of the respondents' default judgment
in Ontario. Cumulatively, at all events, these continuing omissions seem to me
to demonstrate an unfair procedure which in this particular case failed to meet
the standards of natural justice.37
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice LeBel, expresses much stronger
concerns. In reasons considerably more expansive than those provided by either
the majority or the Binnie/lacobucci dissent, Justice LeBel asserts that the
possible circumstances arising within foreign legal proceedings as illuminated
in Beals call for a reformulation of the traditional nominate defences to enforcement.
Justice LeBel does not explicitly endorse an expansion of the public policy
defence to include Justice Jennings' "judicial sniff test," and notes international
efforts at the Hague Conference on Private International Law to develop a treaty
instrument that would confer discretion on a court to limit the quantum of a
foreign judgment if the court was satisfied that the amount of the award was
grossly excessive.
However, he would "continue to reserve the public
policy defence for cases where the objection is to the law of the foreign forum,

35.

Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 464-65.

36.

Id. at 465-69.

37.

Id. at 470-71.

38.
Id. (LeBel, J., dissenting) (citing Jacob S. Ziegel, Enforcement of ForeignJudgments in Canada,
Unlevel Playing Fields and Beals v. Saldanha:A Consumer Perspective, 38 CAN. BUS. L.J. 294, 306-307
(2003) (citing Hague Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999, art. 33, http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/jdgmdrafte.pdf)).
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rather than the way the law was applied, or the size of the award per se."39
Nevertheless, Justice LeBel is equally clear that "there is more work for this
defence to do. It should also apply to foreign laws that offend basic tenets of
our civil justice system, principles that are widely recognized as having a quality
of essential fairness."4 One example Justice LeBel cites in this regard as a
candidate for non-enforcement should resonate with an American legal audience
is as such: a Canadian court presented with a judgment from a jurisdiction
whose law provides, for example, that punitive damages can be awarded on the
basis of simple negligence or strict liability ought to have a discretion to deny
or limit the enforceability of the judgment on grounds of public policy.4 It is
important to note here, again principally for the benefit of an American legal
audience familiar with statutory prescriptions for punitive damages in civil
cases, that Canadian courts do currently enforce without serious question
foreign judgments embracing extensive punitive damages awards where even
the threshold of simple negligence is barely met.4 2 Indeed, the majority of the
Supreme Court did just that in Beals. It bears emphasis, however, that the
LeBel dissent sees the future differently.
With regard to the defence of fraud, Justice LeBel generally adheres to the
majority approach of requiring fresh evidence of fraud not reasonably
discoverable at first instance to properly invoke the defence. Justice LeBel
would not, however, rule out the possibility that a broader test should apply to
default judgments in cases where the defendant's decision not to participate was
a demonstrably reasonable one. If the defendant ignored what it justifiably
considered to be a trivial or meritless claim, and can prove on the civil standard
that the plaintiff took advantage of his absence to perpetrate a deliberate
deception on the foreign court, it would be inappropriate to insist that a
Canadian court asked to enforce the resulting judgment must turn a blind eye to
those facts.43
Nevertheless, Justice LeBel finds that neither of the two preceding
defences would support a reversal in favour of the Saldanhas. Rather, his
principal concern, in common with the Binnie/Iacobucci dissent, is one of
natural justice applied to the facts of the particular case before him. Justice
LeBel embraces the notion expressed by the English Court of Appeal in Adams
v. Cape Industries' and by Justice Weiler, dissenting in the Ontario Court of
39.

Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 508.

40.

Id.

41.

Id. at 511.

42.
See e.g., Old North State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Services, Inc., [1999] 4 W.W.R. 573
(B.C.C.A.) (upholding North Carolina default judgment of treble damages and punitive damages).
43.

Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 515.

44.

Adams v. Cape Industries, [1991] 1 All. E.R. 929 (C.A. 1989).
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Appeal on Beals, that the natural justice defence comprises both substantive as
well as procedural elements "such as the proposition that damages should be
'
based on objective proof and judicial assessment."45
Applying substantive and procedural considerations to the case before him,
Justice LeBel concludes that the Saldanhas were deprived of natural justice:
first in relation to lack of proper notice on the basis of which to make an
informed decision to continue defending in the Florida proceeding, and further,
in terms of substantive unfairness in the quantum of general damages without
apparent objective proof of the harm suffered, together with the awarding of
punitive damages without proof of conduct deserving of punishment.46 Under
this reasoning, in marked contrast to the six-justice majority of the Supreme
Court, the natural justice defence was available, notwithstanding the Saldanhas'
failure to defend.
What Justice LeBel appears to be allowing for here within the context the
natural justice defence is a subsidiary defence of reasonable expectation as to
both process and consequences, even though such expectations are uninformed
and clearly unjustified when placed in the context of the foreign legal proceeding. Justice LeBel observes:
The evidence at trial was that Florida's legal system provides all the
appropriate protections for judgment debtors in the appellants'
position and probably would have afforded them a remedy in these
circumstances. But at the relevant time the appellants did not know
this; they only knew that Florida's legal system had produced a judgment against them for an astronomical amount, a verdict that was
difficult to reconcile with the simple facts they had set out in their
defence. Their apprehensiveness about going back to that very legal
system to seek relief was, in the circumstances, understandable.4 7
Justice LeBel could have stopped there, but decided to go further. Even
if his expanded view of natural justice did not avail, he would decline to enforce
on a residual ground of general unconscionability:
The circumstances of this case are such that the enforcement of this
Judgment would shock the conscience of Canadians and cast a negative light on our justice system. The appellants have done nothing
that infringes the rights of the respondents and have certainly done
nothing to deserve such harsh punishment. Nor can they be said to
have sought to avoid their obligations by hiding in their own
45.

Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 518.

46.

Id. at 523.

47.

Id. at 527.
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jurisdiction or to have shown disrespect for the legal system of
Florida. They have acted in good faith throughout and have diligently
taken all the steps that appeared to be required of them, based on the
information and advice they had. The plaintiffs in Florida appear to
have taken advantage of the defendants' difficult position to pursue
their interests as aggressively as possible and to secure a sizeable
windfall. In an adversarial legal system, it was, of course, open to
them to do so, but the Ontario court should not have to set its seal of
approval on the judgment thus obtained without regard for the
dubious nature of the claim, the fact that the parties did not compete
on a level playing field and the lack of transparency in the Florida
proceedings.48
The residual category of concerns resorted to by Justice LeBel is, on the
one hand, a refuge for judicial discretion. In extreme cases, it may have a place
where none of the bright-line rules quite fit. On the other hand, an unconscionable test in the hands of lower court judges potentially lacking the world view
that informed Justice LaForest in Morguard, could be equally viewed as
something of a trojan horse undermining the substantial connections test which,
simplicity, the Supreme Court of Canada has unanimously affirmed.
V. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS

At this time, Canada taken as a whole, and specifically in individual provinces, is one of the most hospitable jurisdictions in the world for the recognition and enforcement ofjudgments from foreign jurisdictions. It has become so
through perhaps, due to an overly generous adoption to twentieth and twentyfirst century circumstances of the nineteenth century common law doctrine.
Unfortunately, at least for Canadian defendants, international comity is neither
universally shared doctrine, nor even championed any longer by the jurisdictions in which it was originally developed.49 While Canada is also distinguished by a large and important civil law jurisdiction in the province of
Quebec where the applicability of common law doctrine derived from
Morguardand Beals may be debated, the pragmatic approach of Quebec courts
to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments complements that of
the Canadian approach overall.5 0

48.
49.

Id.
See Lawrence Collins, Comity in Modern Private International Law, in REFORM AND
DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH 89-110 (James
Fawcett ed., 2002).
50.
Civil Code of Quebec, R.S.Q. ch. 64, §3134-40 (2004XCan.); Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. Am.
Mobile Satellite Corp., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 205.
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The result is a situation of opportunity for foreign plaintiffs and one of
some risk and discomfort to Canadian defendants exposed at home to foreign
standards of justice with which they are unfamiliar. The Supreme Court
dissents in Beals sound a muted alarm in that regard, but the majority has
confirmed a reality that will be difficult to substantially alter in future cases.
Once the substantial connections test is met, and barring extensive procedural
sloppiness by an originating court, the only latitude that remains for denying
recognition and enforcement by a Canadian court lies within the currently
narrow parameters of the established impeachment defences. The Supreme
Court of Canada has left open the possibility of expansion within those
categories, but apart from Justice LeBel in vigorous dissent, there seems little
current judicial appetite for residual protectionism in aid of hapless or unlucky
Canadian defendants." Similarly, there is no suggestion that recognition or
enforcement should be predicated on conditions of reciprocity within the
originating jurisdiction. However, all of these concerns are voiced in the
legislative precincts of law reform and by governmental private international
law visionaries and putative legal engineers at the Hague. 52 It remains to be
seen whether any of those efforts will come to fruition. But, from a Canadian
perspective, critics ofjudicial methodology and legal consequences in Beals and
the work of Canadian lower courts that Beals has implicitly endorsed, may have
little alternative but to embrace and advocate some form of legislated law
reform agenda. The Canadian courts are unlikely to re-engage in such a task any
time soon. Indeed, as previously noted, Justice Major signaled with some clarity
that legislative reform was an available alternative to the road taken since
Morguard,but not one the Court was inclined to vary of its own accord. 53
In the meantime, what does all this mean for American litigants bringing
the results of American justice to Canada? A truly generous and hospitable
environment! Given constitutionally imposed standards of "minimum contacts"
required to support the assumption of in personam jurisdiction by American
state and federal courts over foreign defendants, fulfillment of the substantial
connections test as applied by Canadian enforcing courts would appear to be a
virtually foregone conclusion.' Finally, notwithstanding some disquiet in
51.
Since Beals was decided, two of the judges supporting the majority opinion of justice Major
(Gonthier, J. and Arbour, J.) have retired or resigned, together with one of the dissenting justices (lacobucci).
See at http://www.scc.csc.gc.ca (last visited June 12, 2005).
52.
See Ronald Brand, Concepts, Consensusand the Status Quo Zone: Getting to "Yes " on a Hague
Jurisdictionand Judgments Convention, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES:
CONFLICT AND COHERENCE 71-108 (Chi Carmody et. al. eds., 2003).
53.

Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 416.

54.
See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (interpreting the "Due Process" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to require out-of-state or foreign defendants to have
certain "minimum contacts" with the jurisdiction before jurisdiction to adjudicate is established); Muscutt
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Canada for the profligacy of American civil trial juries, Canadian courts are
basically sending the message that different standards of justice between
jurisdictions on the quantum of damages are not unenforceable ones. In short,
the season is open, and the hunting is good. Welcome to Canada.

v. Courcelles, [2002] 60 O.R. 3d 20 (discussing Canadian standards for assumption of jurisdiction and the
preferability of a broader approach-extending to substantial connections between the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim and the forum--than that suggested by U.S. "minimum contacts" analysis).

